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USSR - US - ARMS CONTROL: A Soviet official stated privately on Thursday that Moscow would continue to support a comprehensive ban on both chemical and biological weapons (CBW), rather than a separate prohibition on biological weapons, favored by the US.

The official, who is attending the UN General Assembly session, told a US disarmament official that the subject has a "high political content" in Moscow and, for that reason, the Soviets are unlikely to support a separate ban. He implied that because of continued US use of "chemical weapons" in Vietnam, Moscow could not agree to ban only biological weapons.

In fact, the idea of a comprehensive ban on CBW is favored by a majority of delegations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and Soviet support for a total ban apparently has been designed primarily to gain a propaganda advantage over the US. The Soviet official's remarks are a rare admission that Moscow is motivated by the propaganda aspects of the CBW issue.

Some Soviet officials had suggested recently that the USSR might be more receptive to the separate ban on biological weapons if the US would ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol on CBW. At the last session of the Geneva disarmament talks, the Soviets were also implying a softening of their insistence on a single comprehensive treaty. Nevertheless, the USSR has not publicly moderated its view since Foreign Minister Gromyko presented the draft of a comprehensive ban to last year's session of the Assembly, and Moscow seems intent on squeezing further propaganda advantage from the issue. [redacted]

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INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: The USSR joined the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Thursday, an action that bore no relationship to the hijacking of the Soviet airliner to Turkey, because the decision was probably made some time ago.

ICAO has been in existence for 26 years, and the Soviets for some time had been the only holdout among the major air transport nations. Membership in ICAO presumably is desired by Moscow at this time to increase Soviet influence in international civil aviation matters and would involve participation in multilateral decisions relating to the wave of hijackings. The USSR's reluctance to oppose Arab views may, however, serve as a partial brake on Soviet cooperation in dealing with hijackers.

The ICAO legal committee has completed at its current meeting work on a draft "unlawful seizure" convention that would require adhering states receiving hijackers either to extradite or prosecute them. This convention will now be considered by a diplomatic conference at The Hague in early December and subsequently opened for signature. Still under committee consideration is the US-proposed air transport sanctions convention, which would apply a multilateral boycott of air services against any nation harboring hijackers engaged in international blackmail. It is not expected to receive approval at the current session. [redacted]

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UN-JORDAN: The status of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Jordan in the wake of the recent civil war remains unsettled.

UNRWA officials have told the US that the agency has no funds to finance emergency relief or reconstruction activities there and, in fact, has no reconstruction plans in hand. They doubt that UNRWA can do more than restore normal food, health, and, to the extent possible, education services in the refugee camps. Some 30-35,000 students lack school facilities in the camps as a result of the heavy damage and looting. UNRWA has garnered no affirmative responses from UN members to its recent appeal for funds to cover the approximate \$5.1 million deficit for 1970 operations and the additional estimated \$3 million needed for rehabilitation in the wake of the army-fedayeen warfare.

The scope of future UNRWA activity in Jordan remains a delicate issue for both agency officials and the Jordanian Government. The US ambassador in Jordan reports that King Husayn would like to place some curbs on UNRWA's activity--believing that the degree of autonomy the agency enjoys had facilitated fedayeen utilization of the camps. He is reluctant, however, to move in that direction while a massive reconstruction effort, for which Amman lacks funds, remains the primary requirement.

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MALAGASY REPUBLIC: President Tsiranana has designated his successor.

Tsiranana, who has been in poor health since he suffered a stroke last February, named Andre Resampa first among the four vice-presidents created by a recent constitutional amendment. As first vice-president, Resampa would, at Tsiranana's death, become acting president until the presidential election that must then be held within 120 days. This election would most likely be a mere formality because Resampa, who already controls most of the internal security apparatus and the ruling party, would be in a predominant position.

Tsiranana, who has no intention of giving up the presidency before his death, has sought to control the ambitious Resampa by appointing his rivals to two of the three other vice-presidencies. These politicians were given lower rank than Resampa, but Tsiranana retains the prerogative of rearranging the order of precedence should Resampa become too obstreperous or fail to perform his ministerial duties adequately. Resampa, nevertheless, is still most likely to succeed. He is no doubt aware of the President's sensitivities and in the past has shown that he is an effective administrator willing to cooperate in return for a chance at the presidency.

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HUNGARY: The Hungarians have expressed a "thanks-but-no-thanks" attitude toward praise in the Western press of its so-called liberal reforms. Recent New York Times and Newsweek articles favorably reviewed the reforms, Hungary's increased trade with the West, and its liberal cultural policy. An editorial in the main party daily of 13 October characterized these articles as attempts to sow discord and suspicion in the Socialist world. Hungarian nervousness over the possible reaction of conservative Eastern European allies to press coverage of reforms on the agenda of the upcoming tenth party congress is probably the cause for this display of sensitivity. Hungarian officials have implied to Embassy officers in Budapest that they do not wish to be publicly treated by the US as warmly as Romania and Yugoslavia, the "heretics" of the Communist world.

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PERU: The recent creation of a state mining company will strengthen the government's hand in negotiating with US copper companies for majority state participation. The new company, Empresa Minera del Peru, will have an authorized capital of \$250 million; it will manage all state mining activities and act as the governmental partner in joint ventures. It probably also will develop the large copper concession recently relinquished by the American Smelting and Refining Company.

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